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MIXED SPEECH: INEQUITIES THAT
RESULT FROM AN AMBIGUOUS DOCTRINE
SCOTT WELLIKOFF
I. INTRODUCTION
Speech comes in a variety of forms. The American court
system and legislature have had a field day trying to classify the
many varieties of speech, applying different standards and tests
to determine if the particular expression deserves First
Amendment protection. One such distinction is between
commercial and non-commercial speech.1
The First Amendment ensures protection to speak one's mind.2
It allows many types of speakers to convey messages that may be
unpopular, insulting or misleading without the fear of
persecution.3 Individuals have a fundamental right to speak. 4
1 See David Hoch & Robert Franz, Eco-Porn Versus the Constitution: Commercial
Speech and the Regulation of Environmental Advertising, 58 ALB. L. REV. 441, 461 (1994)
(mentioning that there remains a distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech); see also Edward J. McAndrew, City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network Inc.:
Elevating the Value of Commercial Speech?, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 1247, 1248 (1994) (noting
that questions regarding proper definitions of commercial speech remain unanswered by
courts). See generally Scott Servilla, First Amendment - Commercial Speech - First
Amendment Prohibits Laws that Favor Newsracks Containing Non-Commercial
Publications over Dispensing Devices Containing Commercial Publications, 24 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1089, 1091 (1993) (commenting that courts have not consistently applied
one standard).
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing that Congress shall make no law abridging the
freedom of speech); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (providing, in part: "No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States..." making First Amendment restrictions binding on States). See
generally Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L.
REV. 627, 632 (1990) (demonstrating Framers' belief that free speech was essential to
principles of self-government).
3 See Richard D. Bernstein, First Amendment Limits on Tort Liability for Words
Intended to Inflict Severe Emotional Distress, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1749 (1985) (noting
that offensive speech and unpopular speech is protected by the First Amendment); see
also Irina V. Nirshberg, Prior Restraint on Speech and Workplace Discrimination: The
Clashing of Two Fundamental Rights, 34 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 577, 581 (2001) (examining
statutes that seriously abridge offensive and unpopular speech as repugnant to the First
Amendment). See generally Wayne Lindsey Robbins, Jr., When Two Liberal Values
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Those entitled to the full benefit of free speech protection often
include religious speakers, political speakers, and those relaying
messages related to matters of public concern. 5 It is this
protection that makes our democracy a melting pot of ideas. 6
Commercial speech is often categorized as expression with an
economic motive. 7 Based on this motivation, the government is
free to regulate it if deemed false or misleading.8 As such, a
commercial speaker may need to confront the possibility of a
disadvantage in the marketplace of ideas.9
Collide in an Era of "Political Correctness" First Amendment Protection as a Check on
Speech-Based Title VII Hostile Environment Claims, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 789, 793 (1995)
(arguing that limits on unpopular speech should receive strict First Amendment
scrutiny).
4 See Richard J. Ansson, Jr., Drawing Lines in the Shifting San& Where Should the
Establishment Wall Stand? Recent Developments in Establishment Clause Theory:
Accommodation, State Action, the Public Forum, and Private Religious Speech, 8 TEMP.
POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 1, 4 (1998) (expressing guarantees of First Amendment for
speakers); see also Michael Schofield, Muzzling Corporations: The Court Giveth and the
Co urt Taketh Away a Corporation's "Fundamental Right" to Free Political Speech in
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 52 LA. L. REV. 253, 255 (1991) (discussing speech
as fundamental right). See generally R. Scott Shields, Comment, Suturing Discourses with
the First Amendment, 34 HOuS. L. REV. 1531, 1535-51 (1998) (regarding various forms of
speech and their protection under First Amendment).
5 See Robert G. Schwemm & Rigel C. Oliveri, A New Look at Sexual Harassment
Under the Fair Housing Act: The Forgotten Role of 3604(c), 2002 WiS. L. REV. 771, n.285
(2002) (providing types of speech, including religious and political advocacy about issues
of public concern, considered "core" and deserving First Amendment protection); see also
Shields, supra note 4, at 1535 (describing political speech as at top of hierarchy of
protected speech). But see Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to
Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L. REV. 671, 731 (1983) (advocating against categorization of
types of speech to implement graded levels of protection).
6 See Anne M. Gaughan, Note, Denver Area Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC:
The Regulation of Protected Speech on Certain Cable Channels, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 775,
775 (1997) (illustrating fundamental place of First Amendment in American
jurisprudence); see also Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
119, 142 (1989) (noting various justifications for free speech and its relationship to
diversity of ideas). See generally R. George Wright, Dominance and Diversity: A Risk
Reduction Approach to Free Speech Law, 34 VAL. U.L. REV. 1, 7 (1999) (describing
diversity of ideas as primary motive behind free speech laws).
7 See Robert T. Cahill, Jr., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.: Towards
Heightened Scrutiny for Truthful Commercial Speech?, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 225, 226 (1994)
(stating that "commercial speech" has received various interpretations); see also Kozinski,
supra note 2, at 634 (describing commercial speech as for-profit speech). See generally
Melissa S. Skilken, This Ban's For You: 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 65 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1387, 1397 (1997) (commenting that commercial speech has an economic motive).
8 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 496 (1996) (Stevens, J.,
plurality) (noting that only non-misleading commercial speech is protected); see also Alex
Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech, 71
TEX. L. REV. 747, 755 (1993) (mentioning exacting requirement that commercial speech be
true). See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The
Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 126 (1996) (detailing that
regulation of false and misleading speech is not scrutinized under the First Amendment).
9 See 0. Lee Reed, A Free Metavalue for the Next Millennium: Autonomy of
Consciousness in First Amendment Theory and Practice, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 7-8 (1997)
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When commercial speech and non-commercial speech collide
we must decide whether the expression deserves free speech
protection. This situation is often referred to as mixed speech.1O
An example of this collision occurs when commercial speakers
use background institutions to convey their message.U We also
see a tension when fully protected speakers have economic
motivations.12 This situation results in an inequity of First
Amendment protection, disadvantaging those deemed
commercial speakers, while allowing noncommercial speakers to
control the debate.13
This article reveals the ambiguities and inequities resulting
from commercial/noncommercial speech distinction. It addresses
the situation where a commercial message is combined with a
noncommercial message forcing the court to decide what degree
(comparing protection afforded to political speech in marketplace of ideas to lesser
protection commercial speech receives); see also Kozinski, supra note 8, at 754 (indicating
differences between commercial and non-commercial speech). See generally Shields, supra
note 4, at 1535 (describing differences in value between political and commercial speech).
10 See Chia Heng Ho, Entertainment: A. Right of Publicity: 1. First Amendment:
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 527, 532 (2002) (noting that
mixed speech involves commercial and communicative elements); see also Tyler Trent
Ochoa, ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing Inc.: Introduction: Tiger Woods and the First
Amendment, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 381, 384 (2000) (illustrating examples of mixed speech).
See generally Kerry Lorraine McBride, Constitutional Issues: Commonwealth v. Ronald D.
Provost, 17 J. Juv. L. 173, 177 (1996) (providing an example of mixed speech).
11 See David A.J. Richards, A New Paradigm for Free Speech Scholarship, 139 U. PA.
L. REV. 271, 281 (1990) (advocating theory covering speakers hiding behind background
institutions); see also Ronald F. Wright, Ken Greenawalt and the Border Skirmishes of the
First Amendment: Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language, 39 EMORY L.J. 1245, 1245
(1990) (noting that situation-altering speech should have separate standards). See
generally R. George Wright, An Emotion Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 34 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 429, 431 (2003) (arguing that these conflicts would be resolved by focusing on
overall message sought to be communicated).
12 See J. Wesley Earnhardt, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky: A Golden Opportunity to Define
Commercial Speech - Why Wouldn't the Supreme Court Finally "Just Do It"?, 82 N.C. L.
REV. 797, 799 (2004) (discussing varying approach to commercial speech); see also Martin
H. Redish, Product Health Claims and the First Amendment: Scientific Expression and
the Twilight Zone of Commercial Speech, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1433, 1437 (1990) (arguing
that motivation has not determined level of protection for speech in other contexts). See
generally Richards, supra note 11, at n.38 (citing Greenawalt's commentary on the
conflict).
13 See Sean T. Geary, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce: Freedom of
Expression Issues Implicated By Expenditures In Candidate Elections, 72 B.U. L. REV.
825, 831 (1992) (indicating that commercial speech is less important to listener's
informational interests and that of speech of natural persons and therefore receives less
protection); see also Mary B. Nutt, Trends in First Amendment Protection of Commercial
Speech, 41 VAND. L. REV. 173, 180-85 (1988) (exploring trends toward greater protection
of disadvantaged commercial speech). See generally Allan Tananbaum, "New and
Improved" Procedural Safeguards for Distinguishing Commercial from Noncommercial
Speech, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1821, 1826-29 (1998) (distinguishing standards applied to
disfavored commercial speech with noncommercial speech).
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of First Amendment protection is to be applied.14 Part II of this
article discusses the First Amendment, providing an analysis of
the amendment's history, purpose, and applicability to speech.
An overview of commercial speech is provided in Part III. The
section includes a brief history of the commercial speech doctrine,
its evolution, and contribution to society. Part IV provides the
tests and standards applicable to commercial speech. It explains
how the First Amendment is applied to commercial speakers and
the government's ability to regulate them. Part V explores the
distinction between commercial speech and noncommercial
speech. It provides the alleged justifications for the distinction,
defines commercial speech, and provides commercial speech
characteristics. Part VI advocates abandoning the distinction by
explaining the flaws and potential ambiguities and inequities
associated with the distinction. Part VII discusses mixed speech,
the forms it can take, and inequities that result. Lastly, Part
VIII proffers remedies for false and misleading speech absent a
commercial/noncommercial speech distinction.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT: AN OVERVIEW OF ITS HISTORY,
PURPOSE, GUARANTEES AND STANDARDS
Free speech is an idea embedded in the Constitution and
consistently upheld by the courts.15  The United States
Constitution's First Amendment, part of the Bill of Rights,
provides in part that "Congress Shall make no law.., abridging
the freedom of speech ... ."16 Although only Congress is
mentioned, the United States Supreme Court has held that the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause makes the freedom
of speech provision operate to limit the authority of state and
14 See Ho, supra note 10, at 532 (discussing combinations of commercial and
noncommercial speech); see also Hoch & Franz, supra note 1, at 452 (examining standards
applied by courts when commercial speech is entwined with noncommercial speech). See
generally Jef. I. Richards, Politicizing Cigarette Advertising, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1147,
1199 (1996) (identifying potential problems with increasingly labeling speech as mixed).
15 See Michael Kent Curtis, Education and the Constitution: Shaping Each Other and
the Next Century: Teaching Free Speech from an Incomplete; see also Alex Kozinski &
Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 632 (1990)
(exploring evolution of free speech protections). See generally Fossil Record, 34 AKRON L.
REV. 231, 232-41 (2000) (examining early free speech jurisprudence); Robert L. Tsai,
Conceptualizing Constitutional Litigation As Anti-Government Expression: A Speech-
Centered Theory of Court Access, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 835, 884 (2002) (highlighting
consistency in protecting "effective" free speech rights).
16 U.S. CONST, amend. I.
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local governments as well.17 This translates into a broad realm of
protection for many speakers wishing to express a point of view
without the fear of prosecution based on their message.
The purpose for protection of speech can be traced back to the
creation of the United States and the hopes and wishes of the
Founding Fathers.' 8  "Those who won our independence
believed.. .that public discussion is a political duty; and that
this should be a fundamental principle of the American
government."19 Since that time there has been a powerful
national commitment to the protection of speech. 20
The Framers constitutionally safeguarded speech to guarantee
an uninhibited exchange of ideas. 21 "It is a prized American
privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect
17 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 336 n.1 (1995) (noting that
Constitution is applicable to States); see also Cimjotti v. Paulsen, 230 F. Supp. 39, 41
(N.D. IA 1964) (stating that First Amendment applies to States as well as Congress); cf.
Citizens Against Gov't Takeover v. Giarruso, 490 So. 2d 510, 511 (La. Ct. App. 1986)
(noting First Amendment applies to States by virtue of Fourteenth Amendment).
18 See Nancy V. Mate, Piercing the Shield: Reporter Privilege in Minnesota Following
State v. Turner, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1563, n.16 (1998) (providing one purpose of free speech
considered by Founders); see also Editorial, Is Nude Dancing Free Speech?, ATL. J.
CONST., Jan. 10, 1991, at A14 (indicating Founders' desire to give citizens a voice to
challenge government). See generally Editorial, Defining the First Amendment, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, July 29, 1986, at 17 (stating that Founders viewed right to free speech as
vitally important).
19 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Court stated,
They recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew
that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction;
that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that
the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and
proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.
Id. at 270. For further views that public discussion can be considered a rational political
duty, see Editorial, Constitution Changes, But Principles Endure, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept.
17, 1999, at 42 and William Yelverton, A First Amendment Refresher is Urgently Needed,
TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 11, 2004, at 2.
20 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (explaining importance of protecting free speech
rights of those debating public issues); see also Robyn E. Blumer, Anti-Abortion Site
Doesn't Cross the Line, ST. PETE. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1999, at 6D (mentioning Supreme Court
case which protected speech, creating "menacing atmosphere in the context of a broad
public debate"). See generally Excerpts From Ruling Written by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 1988, at A18 (discussing Falwell v. Hustler in which Court held that
Falwell must show "actual malice" to prevail).
21 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (noting that First Amendment
"was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political
and social changes desired by the people."); see also Editorial, Protecting Free Speech:
Protecting Children From Exposure to "Indecent" Material is a Problem For Parents, Not
Government, to Solve, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 14, 1996, at A20 (positing First
Amendment was crafted to provide open exchange of ideas and information). See generally
Excerpts From an FCC Statement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1987, at C26 (espousing purpose of
First Amendment was to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas).
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good taste. . . ."22 Therefore, individuals enjoy the freedom to
engage in unpopular dialogue. 23
The truth of what is spoken is often an immaterial element as
to whether protection is attached.24 Constitutional protection
does not depend on whether others agree with what was said or
whether the statement was exaggerated or even false. 25 Madison
once said that some degree of abuse is inherent in everything. 26
Freedom of speech provides an example of an abused
protection. 27 In order for the freedom of speech to be effective,
erroneous statements must be tolerated. 28 In Cantwell v.
Connecticut,29 the Court stated:
22 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941).
23 See Dennis Horgan, Freedom of Speech Seen as Centerpiece, HARTFORD COURANT,
Dec. 15, 1991, at A9 (citing statistics demonstrating majority of Americans want even
most unpopular speech protected); see also Timothy A. Mitchell, Truth: The Price of Free
Speech, NEWSDAY, Sept. 20, 1991, at 66 (asserting all speech, not just unpopular speech,
requires protection). See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech
Law: What Copyright Has In Common With Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance
Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 22 (2000) (indicating
unpopular speech is protected as well as popular speech).
24 See David F. McGowan & -Ragesh K. Tangri, Comment, A Libertarian Critique of
University Restrictions of Offensive Speech, 79 CAL. L. REV. 825, n.61 (1991) (pointing out
that "not all speech is true, nor does it necessarily lead to the truth"); see also Defamation
on the Net, IRISH TIMES, April 9, 2001, at 8 (discussing how American press cannot be
liable for defamation by mere negligence in failing to check story's truth because of
importance of their First Amendment rights); cf. Muzzling Critics, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Aug. 15, 2003, at B10 (stating free speech should be protected, even if
conflicting versions of truth are being offered).
25 See Virginia v. Hicks, 123 S. Ct. 2191, 2197 (2003) (arguing against any overbroad
law that has effect of "chilling" constitutionally protected speech); see also Be & K Constr.
Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 531 (2002) (reinforcing idea that speech be given some
"breathing space"); cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963) (providing that truth of
statement is not consideration in determination of whether speech is protected).
26 See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (articulating Madison's belief
that "[some] degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every thing"); see also
Ragano v. Time, 302 F. Supp. 1005, 1008 n.6 (M.D. Fla. 1969) (attributing quote
regarding abuse and its link to "proper use of everything" to Jefferson). See generally
Kovach v. Maddux, 238 F. Supp. 835, 839 (M.D. Tenn. 1965) (purporting that the
proposition is never more true than when dealing with press freedoms).
27 See Letter, Professors Only Stifled the Abuse of Free Speech, TORONTO STAR, Jan.
21, 1986, at A12 (noting abusers of free speech are often provided forums such as
universities to espouse their ideas); see also Orrin G. Hatch, Burning a Flag is Not
Speech, ST. LouIs POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 24, 1989, at 3B (arguing while First Amendment
may protect every idea, it does not protect every method of advocating ideas); cf. William
Safire, Some Don't Distinguish Between Pundit License and Abuse of Free Speech, SUN-
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, FL), May 23, 1997, at 23A (claiming even broadcasting judicial
proceeding can sometimes be an abuse of free speech).
28 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271 (indicating free debate will include erroneous
statements); see also Doreen Carvajal, Misjudging a Book By its Cover, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
14, 2004, at C15 (quoting Justice Herman Cahn who said, "While an erroneous statement
of fact is not worthy of constitutional protection, it is inevitable in a free debate."). See
generally Phillip Hager, Court Says Private Persons Must Prove Falsity In Libel, L.A.
TIMES, April 22, 1986, at 1 (reminding readers that "actual malice" must be proven in
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In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief,
sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man
may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade
others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at
times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who
have been, or are, prominent in church or state, and even to
false statement. But the people of this nation have been
ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the
probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the
long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct
on the part of the citizens of a democracy. 30
The protection of the public requires that information be
received, regardless of who is speaking or others' belief in what
was said.31 Errors of fact are inevitable in a free debate and open
the door for others to counter the misleading information
conveyed. 32
First Amendment guarantees encompass a wide variety of
speech and speakers. Political speech, religious speech, and
speech on matters of public concern are protected regardless of
its societal value.33 A very high threshold must be met in order to
defamation case involving public officials, and that mere falsity is not enough for
liability).
29 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
30 Id. at 310.
31 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272 (explaining, "[whatever] is added to the field of libel
is taken from the field of free debate"); see also Free Speech - Legislator's View On
Publishing Victims' Names Not Shared By All, SEATTLE TIMES, June 14, 1992, at A19
(arguing against proposed legislation to restrict public's "right to know"); cf. Editorial,
Understand Your Right to Know and Flex Muscle To Keep it Strong, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale, FL), July 1, 1997 (discussing amount of information readers read in this
newspaper would not be available if public did not have a "right to know" as protected by
Constitution).
32 See David S. Caudill & Richard E. Redding, Junk Philosophy of Science?: The
Paradox of Expertise and Interdisciplinarity in Federal Courts, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
685, 743 (2000) (stating, with regard to expert testimony, "the best tonic for bad science is
good science"); cf. Gretchen Schuldt, 'Labor Peace' Ordinance Targeted: Suit Says Measure
Violates Rights of Employers, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 10, 2001, at 1B (discussing
ordinance which requires workers during union organizing campaigns to agree not to
express misleading information to employees). See generally Jon Swartz, Corporations
Fight Internet Cybersmear, S.F. CHRON., April 13, 1999, at Cl (alerting readers to
websites allowing free speech containing misleading information).
33 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940) (indicating that religious and
political speech is fully protected as "essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on
the part of citizens of a democracy"); see also Hobbie v. Unemployment App. Comm'n. of
Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 140 (1987) (reiterating need for compelling state interest to violate free
exercise rights of religion as stated in Cantwell); cf. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc.,
472 U.S. 491, 502 (1985) (restating courts may not construe breach of peace statutes to
include peaceful distribution of religious materials).
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overcome these highly regarded and heavily protected forms of
speech. 34
Public officials seeking to recover damages for libel against
critics of their official conduct must prove actual malice with
convincing clarity. 35 Actual malice exists when statements are
made with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for whether
the statement is true. 36 This installs a high degree of protection
for those wishing to criticize or even villianize public officials. 37
Likewise, a high standard must also be met to overcome
protection of statements made with a religious purpose. A
content-based regulation is valid only if strict scrutiny can be
withstood.38 This requires the regulation to be narrowly tailored
to promote a compelling government interest. 39 Overcoming
strict scrutiny is no easy task.40 It provides an enormous level of
34 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 282-83 (granting extensive protection under First
Amendment to political speakers); see also Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310 (referring to
importance of free speech in dissemination of ideas in democratic society); cf. Hobbie, 480
U.S. at 140 (remarking on need for compelling governmental interest to overcome rights
of speakers).
35 See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86 (establishing burden for public officials to
establish claim for damages due to liable); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56
(1988) (concluding "actual malice" standard of N.Y Times v. Sullivan applied to public
figures as well as public officials); Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, 800 F.2d 298, 301 (2nd
Cir. 1986) (placing burden of proving libel on plaintiff and allowing defense of substantial
truth).
36 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280 (defining actual malice); see also Masson v. New
Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991) (giving definition and explanation of actual
malice); cf. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 56 (referring to N.Y Times v. Sullivan
definition of actual malice).
37 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 56 (stating "breathing room" must be given
under First Amendment concerning critical speech of public figures); Falwell v. Flynt, 797
F.2d 1270, 1273-74 (4th Cir. 1986) (laying out First Amendment issues involved in case);
see also Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Alan Isaacman and the First Amendment: A
Candid Interview With Larry Flynt's Attorney, 19 CARDOZo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 313, 340
(2001) (explaining importance of right to criticize public officials and public figures).
38 See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)
(noting that noncommercial speech is entitled to full First Amendment protection); R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992) (positing that content-based restrictions
on speech are presumptively invalid); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492
U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (maintaining standard of strict scrutiny for content-based
regulations on speech).
39 See, e.g., Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813 (articulating strict scrutiny standard); ACLU v.
Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 251 (3rd Cir. 2003) (listing requirements needed for content-based
restriction to pass strict scrutiny); Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 126 (outlining
strict scrutiny standard for content-based restrictions on speech).
40 See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 803 (1985)
(expressing courts are reluctant to interpret types of fora to allow restrictions on speech);
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (positing that
ability of state to restrict speech in public fora is "sharply circumscribed"); see also
Richard J. Peltz, Use "The Filter You Were Born With" The Unconstitutionality of
Mandatory Internet Filtering for the Adult Patrons of Public Libraries, 77 WASH. L. REV.
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protection for religious speakers.4 1 With such safeguards in
place, it is unlikely that speech made with political or religious
overtones will ever be unprotected.42
III. COMMERCIAL SPEECH: ITS HISTORY, EVOLUTION AND
CONTRIBUTION
Despite advertising's role in our nation's formation of ideas,
regulation has long been tolerated. Commercial speech has been
considered less deserving of full First Amendment protection.43
In some cases, the government is free to either regulate it or
entirely prohibit it.44 This understanding results in unequal
treatment of the commercial speaker.
When the commercial speech doctrine was born, no protection
was attached to purely commercial speech. 45 In Valentine v.
397, 444 (2002) (indicating that overcoming strict scrutiny is "extremely demanding"
task).
41 See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-95
(1993) (balancing Establishment Clause rights with Free Speech rights and determining
State's Establishment Clause defense unfounded); see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263, 276 (1981) (finding State did not have "sufficiently compelling" interest in further
separating church and state to allow content-based restriction on religious speech). See
generally Ross Schmierer, An Attempt to Pick Up the Fallen Bricks of the Wall Separating
Church and State After Santa Fe v. Doe, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 1291, 1337 (2002) (noting
court's use of strict scrutiny on behalf of religious speakers).
42 See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394-95 (using strict scrutiny to allow religious
speakers to overcome content-based restriction); Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45
(remarking on difficulty of restricting speech in public fora). See generally Christopher
James Kane, Analyzing the Campaign Finance Debate: The Spectrum of Reform and
Louisiana's Trump Card, 4 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 27, 40 (2003) (explaining need for
compelling interest to overcome political speech restrictions).
43 See Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475-77 (1989)
(explaining Central Hudson test with regards to statutes restricting commercial speech);
see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)
(establishing four-part inquiry to determine whether laws restricting commercial speech
may stand). See generally Robert T. Cahill, Jr., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc.: Towards Heightened Scrutiny for Truthful Commercial Speech?, 28 U. RICH. L. REV.
225, 232 (1994) (noting that commercial speech gets First Amendment protection
although not full protection).
44 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (concluding that government may prohibit
commercial speech that is false or misleading); see also Fox, 492 U.S. at 475 (agreeing
with Central Hudson court that commercial speech is not protected if misleading); Kasky
v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247 (Cal. 2002) (providing that commercial speech receives less
protection than many other forms of speech).
45 See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (commenting that
commercial speech had no constitutional protection); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 266 (1964) (assessing Valentine holding against factual background presented in case
at issue); see also Katherine Earle Yanes, Note, Glickman v. Wileman Bros. Elliot, Inc.:
Has the Supreme Court Lost Its Way?, 27 STETSON L. REV. 1461, 1487 (1998) (indicating
commercial speech initially received no protection).
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Chrestensen,46  Mr. Chrestensen distributed handbills to
advertise the viewing of the inside of a submarine.47 This
violated the Sanitary Law 48 that prohibited the distribution of
handbills. 49 Despite the fact that the opposite side of the flyer
contained a political message, the court considered it purely
commercial speech.50 Justice Roberts explained, "[w]e are...
clear that the Constitution imposes no... restraint on
government as respects purely commercial advertising."51 This
case represents the American court system's initial reluctance to
accept commercial speech as an essential element in the
marketplace of ideas.52
The complete exclusion of commercial speech from First
Amendment protection was short-lived. By the 1970's, the
Supreme Court applied First Amendment protection to
commercial speech. 53 During that period, the Court heard a
46 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
47 See id. at 53 (providing facts of case); see also Chrestensen v. Valentine, 122 F.2d
511, 512 (2nd Cir. 1941) (reviewing underlying facts); Chrestensen v. Valentine, 34 F.
Supp. 596, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (discussing background leading to litigation).
48 See Valentine, 316 U.S. at 53 (noting violation of Sanitary Code); see also
Chrestensen, 122 F.2d at 511 (describing violation of NY Sanitary Code); Chrestensen 34
F. Supp. at 597-98 (introducing facts surrounding Sanitary Code violation).
49 See Valentine, 316 U.S. at 53 (explaining Sanitary Code); see also Chrestensen, 122
F.2d at 511 (describing violation of NY Sanitary Code); Chrestensen 34 F. Supp. at 597-98
(introducing facts surrounding Sanitary Code violation).
50 See Valentine, 316 U.S. at 55 (providing that commercial message prevails); see
also Kendro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1162, 1170-71 (1997) (discussing Court's
judgment regarding commercial character of handbill); Arlen W. Langvardt, The
Incremental Strengthening of First Amendment Protection For Commercial Speech: the
Lessons From Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, 37 AM. BUS. L. J. 587, 592-95 (2000)
(explicating Court's decision to treat double-face flyer at issue as commercial speech).
51 Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54; see also Kozinski, supra note 2, at 628 (averring Court's
holding that commercial speech was outside protection of First Amendment); Daniel E.
Troy, Advertising: Not "Low Value" Speech, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 85, 114 (1999) (detailing
Court's initial determination that advertising was not constitutionally protected).
52 See Valentine, 316 U.S. at 55 (arguing that Court must consider it a commercial
message despite its other attributes); see also Troy, supra note 51, at 114 (describing how
commercial speech was regarded as outside protection of First Amendment). But see
Langvardt, supra note 50, at 587 (noting that in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy in
1976, Court departed from its prior course and held that marketplace of ideas considered
under First Amendment included a place for commercial speech).
53 See Edward J. Eberle, Practical Reason: The Commercial Speech Paradigm, 42
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 411, 440-61 (documenting history and controversy surrounding First
Amendment protection of commercial speech); see also Mark D. Schneider, Peaceful Labor
Picketing and the First Amendment, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1469, n.102 (1982) (noting that
commercial speech received little protection until 1970s). See generally Daniel L. Zelenko,
Note, Do You Need A Lawyer? You May Have to Wait 30 Days: The Supreme Court Went
Too Far In Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1215, 1218-20 (1996)
(describing the limited constitutional protection for commercial speech prior to 1976).
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stream of cases that solidified a limited degree of protection.54 In
1975, the court in Bigelow v. Virginia55 declared that it was an
error to assume "that advertising, as such, was entitled to no
First Amendment protection."56 The following year the court
noted that commercial speech should flow freely in order to form
intelligent opinions. 57 Today, commercial speech is seen as "not
only serving the economic interests of the speaker," but assisting
in the "fullest possible dissemination of information" into the
public debate. 58
Commercial speech serves significant social interests.59 "People
will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough
informed, and.., the best means to that end is to open the
channels of communication rather than to close them."60 The
54 See Jorge L. Carro & Lisa A. Martinez, Ohio's Ethical Prohibition Against the Use
of Dual Degrees In Letterheads: A Time For Change?, 18 DAYTON L. REV. 63, 70-71 (1992)
(revealing erosion of commercial speech doctrine in 1970s); see also Langvardt, supra note
50, at 587 (noting that mid-1970s cases suggested reassessing application of First
Amendment protection to commercial speech). See generally Sullivan, supra note 8, at 129
(viewing commercial speech doctrine as "pragmatic compromise" between treating
advertising as activity fully protected and treating advertising as readily regulable).
55 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
56 Id. at 825; see also Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth,
1996 DUKE L.J. 1, 6-16 (1984) (explaining the history of the marketplace model in
constitutional law and examining its assumptions). See generally Langvardt, supra note
50, at n.3 (suggesting that the Court's holding appeared to jeopardize the rationale of the
Chrestensen Court).
57 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765
(1976) (explaining why free flow of commercial information is indispensable); see also
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (noting significant societal
interests served by "free flow" of commercial speech). See generally Helen Norton, You
Can't Ask (Or Say) That: The First Amendment and Civil Rights Restrictions on
Decisionmaker Speech, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 727, 741 (2003) (indicating that Court
emphasized importance of consumer's interest in availability of commercial information in
its determination that commercial speech was entitled to some constitutional protection).
58 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980)
(noting role of commercial speech in society); see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S.
at 765 (articulating both economic interests and public decision-making aspects of
commercial speech). See generally Ronald A. Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking:
Constitutional Interpretation and Negative First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REV.
1405, 1411 (1987) (stating, "[miost theoretical writings have suggested variants of four
different values as critical to speech protections: individual development, democratic
government, social stability, and truth.").
59 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (stating,
"[The] extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified
principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech provides[.]"); see also
David F. McGowan, Comment, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CAL. L. REV.
359, 416 (1990) (revealing interests that commercial speech serves); cf. Burt Neuborne,
The Supreme Court and Free Speech: Love and a Question, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 789, 802
(1998) (noting that First Amendment protection of commercial speech "exists for only one
reason - to assure a flow of accurate information to consumers necessary to the
functioning of efficient markets.").
60 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761,
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First Amendment presumes some accurate information is better
than no information, even if it is in the form of commercial
speech.6 1 Despite this enhanced appreciation of commercial
speech by the courts, it has yet to receive the full protection
afforded many other classes of speech.62
IV. TESTS AND STANDARDS: APPLYING THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
The commercial speech doctrine has evolved in a way that
opens the door to endless interpretation, ambiguity, and
inequities, disadvantaging the commercial speaker. 63  To
determine whether commercial speech is entitled to the
protections of the First Amendment, the court must consider a
variety of factors. 64 Content-based regulation of commercial
speech is held to the intermediate scrutiny test articulated in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission of
New York.65 The court outlined a four-part test to determine if
766-67 (1993) (suggesting that commercial marketplace provides forum for information
and thoughts to flourish); see also Sullivan, supra note 8, at 132-33 (suggesting that
Court has taken a broader view in depicting "self-government as the aggregate of
individual economic decisions" rather than as "collective deliberation" on public good).
61 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 (indicating that accurate yet incomplete
commercial speech deserves First Amendment protection); see also Edenfield, 507 U.S. at
767 (noting "[Even] a communication that does not do more than propose a commercial
transaction is entitled to the coverage of the First Amendment."). See generally McGowan,
supra note 59, at 416 (maintaining that even if commercial speech seems to be lacking
any informational content, it still may contribute substantially to society).
62 See Norton, supra note 57, at 764 (asserting that Court has recognized series of
'less protected" categories of speech, including commercial speech); see also McGowan,
supra note 59, at 416 (positing Court does not view commercial speech as important as
other types of speech). But see 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522
(1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (averring, "I do not see a philosophical or historical basis
for asserting that 'commercial' speech is of 'lower' value than 'noncommercial' speech.").
63 See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993)
(acknowledging "the difficulty of drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial
speech in a distinct category"); see also In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 (1978) (conceding
that distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech "will not always be easy
to draw"). See generally R. Douglass Bond, Making Sense of Billboard Law: Justifying
Prohibitions and Exemptions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2482, 2517 (1990) (noting "gross inequity"
resulting from commercial and noncommercial speech distinction).
64 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)
(identifying relevant test and factors used by Court in determining whether to
characterize the speech as commercial); see also Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535
U.S. 357, 366-68 (2002) (affirming Central Hudson as applicable test for commercial
speech); Zelenko, supra note 53, at 1219-20 (providing ways to determine whether
commercial speech is to be constitutionally protected).
65 447 U.S. 557 (1980); see also Thompson, 535 U.S. at 367 (observing although First
Amendment protects commercial speech, not all regulation of such speech is
unconstitutional); Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 251 (Cal. 2002) (noting the use of
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protection attaches.66 First, the court determines if the First
Amendment protects the speech involved. 67 In the commercial
speech context, this requires that the speech concern a lawful
activity and not be misleading.68 Next, the court determines
whether the government has a substantial interest in regulating
the speech.69 If the first two steps are answered affirmatively,
the court determines if the regulation directly advances a
governmental interest and whether it is no more expansive than
necessary to serve that interest.70 This last step of the Central
Hudson test does not require the government to adopt the least
restrictive means to regulate the speech, but rather, "a
reasonable fit" between the government's purpose for the
regulation and its means to achieve that purpose. 71
intermediate scrutiny test as opposed to strict scrutiny).
66 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (providing four-part test for commercial speech
regulation); see also Thompson, 535 U.S. at 367 (articulating Central Hudson's four-part
test for determining whether particular commercial speech regulation is constitutionally
permissible); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183
(1999) (agreeing in numerous cases involving restrictions on speech that is "commercial"
in nature, Court has employed Central Hudson's four-part test to resolve First
Amendment challenges).
67 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (explaining first prong of commercial speech
test); see also Thompson, 535 U.S. at 367 (clarifying that under Central Hudson test,
threshold issue is whether commercial speech concerns unlawful activity or is misleading;
if so, First Amendment does not protect such commercial speech); Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389 (1973) (stating First
Amendment does not protect commercial speech about unlawful activities).
68 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (explaining where First Amendment will protect
commercial expression); see also Thompson, 535 U.S. at 367 (asserting if commercial
speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading, First Amendment analysis moves
on to next step: whether government's asserted interest is substantial); 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 497 n.7 (1996) (Stevens, J., plurality) (affirming First
Amendment does not protect commercial speech about unlawful activities).
69 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (providing second prong of commercial speech
test); see also Thompson, 535 U.S. at 367 (commenting that latter three inquiries must be
answered in affirmative for regulation to be found constitutional); Greater New Orleans
Broad. Ass'n, 527 U.S. at 183 (elucidating government bears burden of identifying
substantial interest and justifying challenged restriction).
70 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)
(explaining third prong of test for commercial speech); see also Thompson, 535 U.S. at 367
(2002) (observing in previous cases addressing final prong of Central Hudson test, Court
has made clear that if government could achieve its interests in ways that do not restrict
speech, or that restrict less speech, it must do so); cf. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514
U.S. 476, 490-91 (1995) (holding law prohibiting beer labels from displaying alcohol
content unconstitutional in part because of availability of alternatives, including directly
limiting alcohol content of beers, prohibiting marketing efforts stressing high alcohol
strength, or restricting labeling ban only to malt liquors).
71 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1989)
(clarifying fourth step of Central Hudson test); Greater New Orleans Broad Ass'n, 527
U.S. at 188 (asserting fourth element of Central Hudson test complements third element's
direct-advancement inquiry, asking whether speech restriction is not more extensive than
necessary to serve supporting interests, because government must demonstrate narrow
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The Central Hudson. test leaves the door wide open for the
regulation of certain commercial messages. 72  Unlike fully
protected forms of speech, such as political and religious
expression, false and misleading commercial speech can be fully
regulated and barred if necessary.73 Government can ban forms
of communication more likely to deceive rather than inform the
public. 74 "[T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of
fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially
advances society's interest in 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open'
debate on public issues."75 The First Amendment is concerned
with protecting the informational function of advertising and
when the communication is more likely to mislead public than
inform the public, it should not be protected. 76
tailoring of challenged interest); see also 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 507 (striking down
prohibition on advertising price of alcoholic beverages in part because other forms of
regulation, which would not involve any restriction on speech, were more likely to achieve
state's goal of promoting temperance).
72 See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 195
(1999) (perceiving regulation "distinguishes among the indistinct," sanctioning some
speech that creates same risks government purports to fear while outlawing speech
unlikely to cause any injury); 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 499 (remarking Central Hudson
decision acknowledged special features of commercial speech, yet also identified serious
First Amendment concerns that go along with wholesale advertising exclusions that do
not protect consumers from commercial harms). See generally Maria J. Johnson, Taking
Advantage of Joe Camel's and Marlboro Man's Rights is Unkool and Merits Constitutional
Protection, 21 DAYTON L. REV. 489, 499 (1996) (explaining Central Hudson can produce
inequitable results because of discretion that is left to courts).
73 See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 498 (agreeing that states may regulate some types
of commercial advertising more freely than other forms of protected speech); Kasky v.
Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247 (Cal. 2002) (providing government has right to entirely
prohibit false or misleading commercial speech).
74 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 (indicating ability to ban deception); see also
Thompson, 535 U.S. at 373 (advising if First Amendment means anything, it means that
regulating speech must be "a last-not first - resort"); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 498 (1996) (noting states may restrict forms of aggressive sales
practices that can potentially exert 'undue influence' over consumers).
75 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); see also Rubin, 514 U.S. at
496 (positing not only does regulation of inaccurate commercial speech exclude little
truthful speech from one market, but false or misleading speech in commercial realm also
lacks value that sometimes inheres in false or misleading political speech); Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985) (explaining State and Federal
governments can prevent false, deceptive or misleading commercial speech).
76 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)
(noting types of communication that can be banned); see also 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at
496 (asserting First Amendment protected dissemination of truthful and non-misleading
commercial messages about lawful products and services); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,
514 U.S. 476, 495 (1995) (showing even though some false and misleading statements are
entitled to First Amendment protection in political arena, "the special character of
commercial expression justifies restrictions on misleading speech that would not be
tolerated elsewhere").
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Deciding whether commercial speech is false or misleading is
another hurdle that courts must navigate. 77  Actually or
inherently misleading commercial speech is treated as false, thus
attaching no First Amendment protection. 78 On the other hand,
potentially misleading speech can not be completely banned if
limitations are set in place that ensure that the information is
disseminated in a nonmisleading way. 79 Limitations may include
warning labels and instructions.80 The United States Supreme
Court has stated that "[t]he First Amendment ... does not
prohibit the State from insuring that the stream of commercial
information flow[s] cleanly as well as freely."81
A business enterprise must be aware that the possibility of
government regulation of its speech exists. When it chooses to
promote or defend its sales or profits, it must do so truthfully.8 2
77 See Rubin, 514 U.S. at 494 (averring any portrayal of commercial speech that is
intended to distinguish categories of speech entitled to lesser First Amendment
protections should relate to motivations for permitting broader regulation: namely,
commercial speech's potential to mislead); see also 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 499
(commenting greater "objectivity" of commercial speech justifies giving states more
freedom to differentiate false commercial advertisements from true ones). See generally
Kimberly A. Pace, The Washington Redskins Case and The Doctrine of Disparagement:
How Politically Correct Must A Trademark Be?, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 7, 39 (1994) (indicating
courts must decide if speech is false or misleading).
78 See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 496 (affirming First Amendment protected
distribution of truthful and non-misleading commercial speech about lawful products and
services); see also Rubin, 514 U.S. at 495 (deciding "special character; of commercial
expression substantiates limitations on misleading speech that would not be acceptable
elsewhere"); cf. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 252 (elucidating court's treatment of actual or inherent
misleading speech).
79 See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 496 (asserting how First Amendment sheltered
dispersal of truthful and non-misleading commercial messages about legal products and
services); Rubin, 514 U.S. at 495 (showing some false and misleading statements are
entitled to First Amendment protection in political realm); Kasky, 45 P.3d at 252
(providing limitations on banning potentially misleading speech).
80 See Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Bus. & Prof l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 152 (1994)
(affirming that states may not wholly ban potentially misleading commercial speech if
narrower restrictions can guarantee that such information is presented in "a
nonmisleading manner"); see also In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (positing
misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely, but states may not place absolute
exclusion on specific forms of potentially misleading information). See generally Megan
Hanley Baer & Whitney Moore, Federal Food and Drug Act Violations, 40 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 613, n.126 (2003) (noting effect of disclaimers on potentially misleading commercial
speech).
81 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771-72
(1976).
82 See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247 (Cal. 2002) (explaining burden of business
community when disseminating information about its products or services); see also
Jonathan A. Loeb & Jeffrey A. Sklar, Practice Tips: The California Supreme Court's New
Test for Commercial Speech, 25 L.A. LAWYER 13, 16 (2002) (discussing broad test for what
is considered commercial speech). See generally Victoria Dizik Teremenko, Comment,
Corporate Speech Under Fire: Has Nike Finally Done It?, 2 DEPAuL BUS. & COMM. L.J.
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The same holds true when a business enterprise seeks to provide
facts about its own products or services intended for public use. 83
Most courts do not consider this too heavy a burden for the
commercial speaker to bear when disseminating information to
the public.8 4
V. DISTINGUISHING COMMERCIAL SPEECH FROM
NONCOMMERCIAL SPEECH: A DIFFICULT AND CONVOLUTED TASK
Some believe the difference between commercial speech and
noncommercial speech is inherent.8 5 The Supreme Court has
announced that the "commonsense differences" between
commercial speech and noncommercial speech "suggest that a
different degree of protection is necessary."86 These differences
alluded to by the courts, often by way of footnotes, come in three
forms.8 7 First, commercial speech is allegedly more verifiable by
the speaker than other forms of speech that receives full First
Amendment protection. 88 This is because the disseminator of a
commercial message is said to have a complete understanding of
207 (2003) (discussing Kasky decision and its effect on speech).
83 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 247 (noting need of a business enterprise to speak truthfully
about its own products); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66
(1983) (stating that discussion of products or services, while not determinative, is
generally thought of as commercial speech). See generally Teremenko, supra note 82, at
207 (discussing Bolger and how Court correctly held that speech consisting mainly of
products, services and prices was considered commercial speech).
84 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 247 (providing that imposing burden of truth to business
community is not too heavy a burden). See generally Bolger, 463 U.S. at 69 (noting that
state can regulate commercial speech that is misleading or untruthful); Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770-71 (stating that some forms of commercial speech regulation
are permissible).
85 See generally Kasky, 45 P.3d at 251-54 (discussing differences between commercial
and non-commercial speech); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24 (providing
that there are common-sense differences between commercial and non-commercial
speech); Bolger, 463 U.S. at 64 (noting there are common-sense distinctions between
commercial speech and other types).
86 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772
n.24 (1976).
87 See id. (discussing ways in which commercial speech is different from non-
commercial speech); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980) (discussing reasons why commercial speech can be regulated
based on content); Kozinski, supra note 2, at 634 (explaining that Court addresses what it
perceives to be "commonsense differences" only in footnotes).
88 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24 (noting that commercial
speech is more easily verifiable than political speech); see also Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at
564 n.6 (stating that commercial speakers have extensive knowledge of both their product
and the market); Kozinski, supra note 2, at 634 (noting that commercial speech is more
objective than noncommercial speech because it is more easily verifiable).
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the services or products that he himself provides.8 9 The
commercial speaker allegedly, unlike the noncommercial
speaker, is aware of the content of his message and has the
ability to ensure its accuracy. 90 Second, commercial speech is
engaged in for profit and thus less likely to be chilled.91 A profit
motivation provides a high degree of resistance to attempts to
prevent the message. 92 The last reason for the "commonsense
difference" between commercial and noncommercial speech is
based on the government's authority to regulate.93 It is said that
because the government has the right to regulate commercial
transactions, it can also regulate speech associated with those
transactions. 94 Courts have recognized this reason as the typical
justification for greater government regulation of commercial
speech. 95 Today, the "commonsense distinctions" articulated in
89 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24 (providing that "truth of
commercial speech ... may be more easily verifiable by its disseminator than ... news
reporting or political commentary, in that ordinarily the advertiser seeks to disseminate
information about a specific product or service that he himself provides and presumably
knows more about than anyone else.") (emphasis added); see also Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S.
at 564 n.6 (stating that commercial speakers have extensive knowledge of both their
product and the market). But see Kozinski, supra note 2, at 634-38 (positing that
commercial speech is not more easily verifiable than other types of speech).
90 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6 (noting how commercial speakers have
ability to evaluate accuracy of their message); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772
n.24 (stating that commercial speaker knows more about his product than anyone else);
see also Clark A. Remington, A Political Speech Exception to the Regulations of Proxy
Solicitations, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1462-63 (1986) (noting knowledge of typical
commercial speaker).
91 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6 (stating that commercial speech is hardy and
not likely to be crushed by regulation); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24
(noting that there is little likelihood of commercial speech being chilled by regulation); see
also Kozinski, supra note 2, at 634 (explaining that commercial speech is deemed more
durable than its noncommercial counterpart).
92 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6
(1980) (suggesting that economic self-interest will prevent commercial speech from being
crushed by regulation); see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976) (noting how advertising is main proponent of
profits); cf. Arlen W. Langvardt, Section 43(a), Commercial Falsehood, and the First
Amendment: A Proposed Framework, 78 MINN. L. REV. 309, 371 (1993) (indicating
strength of profit motivation of commercial messages).
93 See 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (Stevens, J., plurality)
(explaining government's authority to regulate commercial activity); see also In re R.M.J.,
455 U.S. 191, 207 (1982) (discussing state authority to regulate commercial activity);
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979) (noting that state does not lose its ability to
regulate commercial activity because speech is involved).
94 See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 499 (noting that power to regulate commercial
transactions is "linked inextricably" with power to regulate speech concerning those
transactions); see also Friedman, 440 U.S. at 9-10 (noting state's ability to regulate
commercial activity); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)
(discussing state regulation of commercial activity and speech).
95 See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 426 (1993) (identifying
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many cases have been used with less frequency since the
adoption of the Central Hudson test.96
The United States Supreme Court has defined commercial
speech as "speech proposing a commercial transaction."97
However, this does not provide a test to determine if one is
speaking commercially. 98  For example, the court accepts
statements of alcohol content and statements on an attorney's
letterhead as commercial speech. 99 These statements, in and of
themselves, do not propose a commercial transaction.10 0 In
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,101 the Court noted that
reference to a specific product and economic motivation, in
isolation, does not make something commercial speech because
these references may sometimes contain another message
unconnected with the product or service.102 This adds to the
"preventing commercial harms" as "the typical reason why commercial speech can be
subject to greater governmental regulation than noncommercial speech"); see also Bolger
v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 81 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting state
regulation of commercial activity as a justification for regulation of commercial speech);
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-56 (noting how commercial speech can be regulated in ways in
which non-commercial speech cannot).
96 See Dennis W. Bishop, Building the House on a Weak Foundation: Edenfield v.
Fane and the Current State of the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1143,
1150 (1995) (noting Central Hudson effect on "commonsense" distinction); see also
Kozinski, supra note 2, at 634-635 (stating that commonsense distinction has been used
less since Central Hudson). See generally Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566-67 (discussing
test for regulating commercial speech).
97 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 (quoting Ohralik).
98 See id. at 580 (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining definition inhibits speech which
is protected by the First Amendment); see also Vincent Brannigan & Bruce Ensor, Speech
and the First Amendment: Did Bose Speak Too Softly?: Product Critiques and the First
Amendment, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 571, 580 (1986) (positing that defining commercial
speech as that which proposes a commercial transaction is too narrow). But see Bolger,
463 U.S. at 68 (stating "[w]e have made clear that advertising which links a product to a
current public debate is not thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded
noncommercial speech.').
99 See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 481-82 (1995) (accepting statement
of alcohol content on the label of beer bottle as commercial speech); see also Ibanez v. Fla.
Dep't of Bus. And Profl Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 142 (1994) (explaining commercial
speech includes statements on attorney's letterhead and business cards identifying
attorney as CPA and CFP). See generally Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976) (recognizing free flow of commercial
information as indispensable).
100 See Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 144 (describing commercial speech not as transaction but
description of valid license); see also Rubin, 514 U.S. at 483 (indicating noncommercial
attributes of a statement of alcohol content on beer labels); Peel v. Attorney Registration
and Disciplinary Comm'n of Illinois, 496 U.S. 91, 110-11 (1991) (describing letterhead
involving certification and expertise as not transactional).
101 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983).
102 See id. at 66-67 (noting economic motivation and reference to specific products
does not always amount to commercial speech); see also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809,
818 (1975) (explicating advertisements are not necessarily commercial speech just
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endless confusion in classifying speech as commercial, receiving
less protection, or noncommercial, entitling it to full First
Amendment protection. 103
Further clouding the issue is the need to look at three elements
to determine if the speech is truly commercial.104 These factors
include: advertising format, product reference, and commercial
motivation. 105 Speech is considered in advertising format if the
message is directed to an audience that will be influenced, or
likely influenced, to engage in a commercial transaction.106
Product reference includes not only statements of price and
quality, but also statements about the manner in which the
product is manufactured, distributed, and sold.107 Finally,
economic motivation infers that the speech is intended to result
in a commercial transaction.10 8 However, even if these factors are
deemed met, it provides only "strong support" for characterizing
the speech as commercial and is not necessarily dispositive.109
because they mention sales or solicitations); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66
(1964) (specifying paid advertisements are not always commercial speech).
103 See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-67 (revealing it is sometimes difficult to determine if
speech is commercial or not). See generally Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,
455-56 (1978) (exemplifying different factors discussed to determine commercial speech);
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (laying out complicating balancing to
determine if speech is commercial).
104 See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-67 (adding additional factors to determine if speech is
commercial); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
562-63 (1980) (explaining commercial speech has limited constitutional value); Va. State
Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 (concluding commercial speech can be regulated).
105 See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67 (providing characteristics of commercial speech). See
generally Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 818 (explaining economic motivation by itself is not enough
to determine whether speech is commercial); Assoc'd Students v. Attorney Gen., 368 F.
Supp. 11, 24 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (clarifying mention of a specific product does not make an
advertisement automatically commercial speech).
106 See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 256 (Cal. 2002) (explaining advertising
format). See generally Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp, 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983)
(mentioning advertising format as a element in classifying commercial speech); N.Y.
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265-66 (mentioning advertisement format does not compel
necessarily conclusion as "commercial").
107 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 256 (explaining product reference). See, e.g,. Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 481-82 (1995) (stating alcohol content on beer bottle label a
product reference); Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Business and Prof I Regulation,, 512 U.S.
136, 142 (1994) (holding attorney qualifications on letterhead as product reference).
108 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 256 (addressing economic motivation). See generally Bolger,
463 U.S. at 66-67 (specifying economic motivation as a commercial speech characteristic);
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, n.24 (1976)
(asserting the limited protection on economically motivated speech).
109 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 256 (addressing all three factors as necessary, but not
conclusive in a commercial speech analysis). See, e.g., Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 140 (accepting
non-advertisement as commercial speech); Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67 (clarifying the
combination of the three factors is "string support" for characterizing the pamphlets as
commercial speech).
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When these factors are not met there still remains the possibility
that the speech will be deemed commercial.110 In light of the
vague definition of what commercial speech entails, it seems the
court will be faced with a difficult task every time it must decide
if commercial speech is involved.' 1
Proponents of a commercial speech distinction point to the
Framer's obsession with protecting political speech.112 They note
that although the Framer's were constantly bombarded with
commercial messages, they never decided to protect commercial
speech at all.113 The argument can be stated as follows: "The
Framers evidenced absolutely no interest in protecting
commercial speech, so it would be a gross misinterpretation of
the First Amendment to construe it to afford commercial speech
the same level of protection as political speech."114
Some believe that qualities inherent in many protected forms
of speech, such as political and commercial speech, are deemed
absent in the commercial arena. 115 Many see fully protected
110 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 256 (using more than these three factors in determining
whether speech is commercial speech); Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-67 (declining to hold that
three factors articulated are dispositive in determining if the speech is commercial). See,
e.g. Leoni v. State Bar, 704 P.2d 183, 185 (Cal. 1985) (holding commercial speech without
satisfying the advertising format prong).
111 See Alison Lynn O'Carroll, First Amendment Implications of State Takeover
Legislation, 38 EMORY L. J. 827, 836 (1989) (indicating difficulty in deciding whether or
not to classify speech as commercial or not); see also Samuel A. DiLullo, The Present
Status of Commercial Speech: Looking For a Clear Definition, 90 DICK. L. REV. 705, 706
(1986) (asserting there are unanswered questions about the definition of commercial
speech). See, e.g. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
567 (1980) (holding distribution of pamphlets advertising electricity as not able to be
regulated).
112 See Kozinski, supra note 2, at 632 (noting the Framer's occupation with political
speech supports the commercial speech distinction). See generally Amy Constantine, Note,
What's in a Name? McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission: An Examination of the
Protection Afforded to Anonymous Political Speech, 29 CONN. L. REV. 459, 460 (1996)
(characterizing political speech as too valuable and rich in history); Robert Firester &
Kendall T. Jones, Catchin' the Heat of the Beat: First Amendment Analysis of Music
Claimed to Incite Violent Behavior, 20 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 4 (2000) (describing
political speech as most important and as highly protected).
113 See Kozinski, supra note 2, at 632-33 (explaining that Framers were exposed to
commercial messages via newspaper advertising, signage, salesmen, and public
marketplace messages but evidenced no interest in protecting commercial speech); see
also Scott Sullivan, Note, Tobacco Talk: Why FDA Tobacco Advertising Restrictions
Violate the First Amendment, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 743, 752 (1997) (positing that
because advertising was less sophisticated in Colonial times, Framers perceived less need
to protect the public from potential commercial abuses). See generally Ronald A. Cass,
Commercial Speech and the First Amendment: Commercial Speech, Constitutionalism,
Collective Choice, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1317, 1346-47 (1988) (discussing "negative theory" of
constitution- making).
114 Koszinski, supra note 2, at 632-33.
115 See David A.J. Richards, A New Paradigm for Free Speech Scholarship, 139 U. PA.
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speech as those expressions that are spontaneous and
authentic.11 6 They look for sincere moral, social or political
conviction in the expression itself.ii 7 The problem with affording
commercial speech the same protection as other forms of speech
must therefore lay in its controlled and manipulative nature,
generally serving the economic interest and structures of the
speaker. 11 8
VI DISPOSE OF THE DISTINCTION
The process for distinguishing commercial from noncommercial
speech is riddled with flaws. 119 The ever-growing complexities of
the commercial speech doctrine necessitate the need for
abandoning the distinction.120 To explain this need, it is best to
start with the Constitution itself.
L. REV. 271, 279-84 (1990) (indicating commercial speech lacks "the spontaneous and
authentic expression of sincere, moral, social, or political conviction" of other forms of
fully protected speech); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n ,
447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980) (pointing out commercial speech is based on economic self-
interest and that its speakers have extensive knowledge of their markets and products,
increasing accuracy); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976) (observing commercial speech is more verifiable and more
durable than other forms of speech).
116 See Richards, supra note 115, at 280 (noting core argument against free speech
protection of advertisements). See generally Cass, supra note 113, at 1324-25 (outlining
ontological view of speech which protects only "autonomous, individual expression");
Edward J. Eberle, Practical Reason: The Commercial Speech Paradigm, 42 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 411, 460-70 (1992) (discussing justifications for differing views of protection based
on speech type).
117 See Richards, supra note 115, at 280 (providing suggested elements of non-
commercial, fully protected speech). See generally Cass, supra note 113, at 1324-25 (1988)
(outlining ontological view of speech which protects only "autonomous, individual
expression"); Edward J. Eberle, Practical Reason: The Commercial Speech Paradigm, 42
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 411, 460-70 (1992) (discussing justifications for differing views of
protection based on speech type).
118 See Richards, supra note 115, at 280 (explaining that commercial speech does not
possess many of the qualities that other forms of speech possess). See generally Cass,
supra note 113, at 1324-25 (1988) (outlining ontological view of speech which protects only
"autonomous, individual expression"); Edward J. Eberle, Practical Reason: The
Commercial Speech Paradigm, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 411, 460-70 (1992) (discussing
justifications for differing views of protection based on speech type).
119 See Martin H. Redish, First Amendment Theory and the Demise of the Commercial
Speech Distinction: The Case of the Smoking Controversy, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 553, 578-79
(1997) (arguing there are flaws in commercial speech doctrine); see also Cass, supra note
113, at 1317 (commenting that virtually every commentator believes Supreme Court
approach to commercial speech is wrong); Kozinski, supra note 2, at 634 (noting that in 14
years since Va. State Board of Pharmacy, Court has been able to identify only two
"commonsense" differences between commercial and noncommercial speech).
120 See Aaron A. Goach, The Supreme Court of the United States, 1996 Term: Free
Speech and Freer Speech: Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 117 S.Ct. 2130 (1997),
21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLi 623, 632-33 (1998) (suggesting abandonment of distinction
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The Constitution make no mention whatsoever of a distinction
between commercial and noncommercial speech.121 The First
Amendment in no way says that no law shall be made abridging
the freedom of speech, except commercial speech. Therefore, it is
apparent that the distinction is the product of flawed
interpretation by the courts and legislature.
The Framers' comments on free speech focus on free speech
leading to self-governance.122 Thomas Jefferson wrote:
The people are the only censors of their governors: and even
their errors will tend to keep these to the true principles of
their institution. ... The basis of our governments being the
opinion of the people, the very first object would be to keep
that right; and were it left to me to decide whether we should
have a government without newspapers, or newspapers
without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to
prefer the latter.123
Jefferson's comments are consistent with Madison's view that
freedom of speech was created to protect the right of the people to
criticize the government.124 Even in more modern times, the
between commercial and noncommercial speech); see also Kozinski, supra note 2, at 651-
52 (arguing abandoning commercial speech distinction will not prevent government from
regulating fraud); Redish, supra note 119, at 565 (positing none of remaining arguments
used to justify distinction between commercial speech and noncommercial speech actually
does so).
121 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech..."); see also Kozinski, supra note 2, at 631 (noting
nothing in text of First Amendment creates distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech); Sullivan, supra note 113, at 752 (concluding while First
Amendment does not include distinction, it does not exclude protection for commercial
speech).
122 See Kozinski, 'supra note 2, at 632 (stating, "[t]he Framers' commentary on
freedom of speech focuses entirely on the importance of speech to self-government."); see
also Goach, supra note 120, at 633-34 (observing Framers were concerned primarily with
free speech as critical ingredient of self-government); 0. Lee Reed, A Free Speech
Metavalue for the Next Millenium: Autonomy of Consciousness in First Amendment Theory
and Practice, 35 Am. BUS. L.J. 1, 6 (1997) (quoting James Madison, "A popular
government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue
to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both... [A] people who mean to be their own
governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.").
123 See Kozinski, supra note 2, at 632 (reciting passage from Jefferson letter to
Edward Carrington, dated Jan. 16, 1787); see also Gary L. Bostwick & Jean-Paul Jassy,
Flanagan's Wake: Newsgatherers Navigate Uncertain Waters Following Flanagan v.
Flanagan, 23 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 39 (2002) (citing passage as espousing Jefferson's
passionate faith in free press); Patrick E. Cole, The Freedom of Information Act and the
Central Intelligence Agency's Paper Chase: A Need for Congressional Action to Maintain
Essential Secrecy for Intelligence Files While Preserving the Public's Right to Know, 58
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 350, 352 (1982) (asserting passage as laying groundwork for citizens'
right to know about affairs of government).
124 See Kozinski, supra note 2, at 632 (noting Madison's view of freedom of speech);
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Constitution's idea of freedom of speech has been to promote
political speech.125 In fact, "[o]ne searches in vain for an
indication from any of the people involved with the drafting or
ratifying of the First Amendment that they were concerned with
anything besides politically oriented speech."126
It is the Framers's own words that many commercial speech
distinction proponents rest their arguments on; however, in
doing so ignore the evolution of the free speech doctrine.127
Nowhere in the constitution does it say that literature should be
protected, yet it is.128 In addition, the Framers never
contemplated nude dancing, but it still falls within the scope of
the First Amendment.129 The commercial/noncommercial speech
distinction is a creation of flawed Constitutional interpretation
and endless tinkering.130 Therefore, "proponents of the
see also Cole, supra note 123, at 355 (observing congruence of Jeffersonian and
Madisonian conceptions of fully informed citizenry); Reed, supra note 122, at 6-7
(analyzing Madison's theory on social value of free speech to democratic community).
125 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 795 (2002) (stating political
speech of candidates is "at the heart of the First Amendment") (Kennedy, J., concurring);
N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (declaring "freedom of expression upon
public questions is secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by our
decisions").
126 Kozinski, supra note 2, at 632.
127 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957) (providing new fully protected
form of speech - portrayal of sex in art, literature, and scientific works - not specifically
mentioned in Constitution); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 256
(2002) (striking down federal law prohibiting virtual child pornography as
unconstitutional infringement on free speech rights); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418
(1989) (refusing to create exception to First Amendment for flag-burning).
128 See Roth, 354 U.S. at 487 (noting that First Amendment protects artistic
expression); see also FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 250-51 (1990) (listing examples
of literature erroneously declared "obscene"); Kozinski, supra note 2, at 633 (stating that
Framers never expressed interest in protecting literature though it maintains that
constitutional protection today under First Amendment).
129 See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 83 (1981) (protecting nude
dancing under the First Amendment); see also City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277,
282-302 (2000) (finding ordinance banning public nudity in Erie, Pennsylvania, legitimate
on the basis that it was a content-neutral ban on symbolic speech); Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-67 (1991) (stating that nude dancing constitutes
expressive conduct within outer limits of First Amendment, but still may be subject to
limitations if founded on legitimate governmental interests).
130 See Kozinski, supra note 2, at 631 (arguing proponents of commercial speech
distinction cannot rest their beliefs on U.S. Constitution); see also C. C. Laura Lin,
Corporate Image Advertising and the First Amendment, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 459, 493-95
(1988) (arguing that current distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech is
inappropriate and based on improper distinctions); Redish, supra note 199, at 553-55
(arguing historical distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech rests on
shaky grounds and that more protection should be provided for commercial speech).
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commercial speech distinction must base their argument on some
other source."131
Other arguments in favor of a commercial/noncommercial
speech distinction are as equally defective as basing it on the
Constitution itself. Using the "commonsense difference" has
provided little support for the distinction. 132 One can see this by
looking to the three factors: verifiability, hardiness and authority
to regulate. 133
The problem with basing a distinction on the verifiability and
objectivity of commercial speech is that it is not necessarily
easier to ascertain truth in commercial messages.134 A quick
observation of modern advertisements makes this apparent. For
example, when a body deodorant company claims their product
helps to attract the opposite sex, or when a fast food restaurant
suggests that its food is better than its competitor. Who is to say
the messages these companies convey are easily verifiable or true
at all?135 In light of this reality, verifiability of commercial speech
is not a commonsense conception.136
131 Kozinski, supra note 2, at 631.
132 See id. at 635-36 (indicating that elements of commonsense distinction are
useless); see also Earnhardt, supra note 12, at 809 (asserting Supreme Court's analysis of
speech has proven unworkable and arguing that Court needs to provide bright line
analysis for the future); Lin, supra note 130, at 474-77 (highlighting confusion resulting
from application of 'commonsense' distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech).
133 See Bernard W. Bell, Judge White and the Exercise of Judicial Power. The
Populism of Justice Byron R. White: Media Cases and Beyond, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1425,
1453-56 (2003) (noting that Supreme Court often justifies diminished protection given to
commercial speech through characteristics such as unusual hardiness and verifiability);
see also Kozinski, supra note 2, at 634-38 (arguing verifiability and durability, as
attributed to commercial speech, provide very weak justification for diminished protection
of such speech); Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 36-37 (2000) (commenting on difficulty in gathering support for Supreme
Court's finding that commercial speech is more easily verifiable than other types of
speech).
134 See Kozinski, supra note 2, at 635 (explaining that commercial speech is not quite
as verifiable as some might think); see also Post, supra note 133, at 36-37 (pointing out
that weak rationale attributing greater verifiability to commercial speech is further
discredited in moving into age of "product image and product-personality advertising');
Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for Expansive
Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 777, 785-86 (1993) (emphasizing that
despite theory that truth is verifiable in the commercial world, the commercial
marketplace is in reality full of hyperbole, hype, and hustles).
135 See Kozinski, supra note 2, at 635 (providing examples of commercial speech that
is not easily verifiable as truth); see also Post, supra note 133, at 36-37 (asserting
twentieth century advertising is in fact not easily verifiable and that view of commercial
speech as more easily verifiable may be from a time now passed). See generally Ronald K.
L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce & Communication, 71 TEX. L. REV. 697, 702-03
(1993) (explaining commercial advertising has evolved from information based model to
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Other forms of speech are easily verifiable as true or false; yet
receive full First Amendment Protection.137 A scientist, for
example, may proclaim that the earth is flat, or a newspaper may
state that an actress had a three-headed baby. No matter how
absurd these examples may seem, they are easily verifiable as
false, yet entitled to full First Amendment protection. It is hard
to dispute that commercial speech is any more or less verifiable
or objective than any other forms of speech.138
Basing the distinction on the durability of commercial speech is
equally unconvincing. Proponents of the distinction argue that
the profit motive of the commercial speaker leads to the inability
to chill it.139 However, "much expression is engaged in for profit
but nevertheless receives full First Amendment protection."140
For example, book publishers and authors, as well as painters
and lobbyist engage in their profession to seek a profit, yet are
fully protected. 141
model based on image and personality).
136 See Kozinski, supra note 2, at 635 (revealing why verifiability is not commonsense
distinction); see also Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial
Speech, 58 MD. L. REV. 55, 75-76 (1999) (noting subjective character of contemporary
advertisements is often cited to dispute claim that commercial speech is intrinsically more
verifiable than other forms of speech). See generally Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 645 (1985) (conceding that distinction between deceptive and
nondeceptive advertising is exceedingly difficult, complex and often boils down to
questions of semantics).
137 See Consuelo Lauda Kertz & Lisa Boardman Burnette, Telemarketing Tug-Of-
War: Balancing Telephone Information Technology and the First Amendment with
Consumer Protection and Privacy, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1029, 1043 n.92 (1992) (providing
example of fully protected speech that is easily verifiable); see also Kozinski, supra note 2,
at 635-636 (noting other forms of speech, such as news and publishing can be verified as
true or false, yet are still fully protected). See generally Post, supra note 133, at 37
(commenting aside from outright false communication, misleading statements are just as
difficult to detect in commercial speech as in any other form of fully protected speech).
138 See Kozinski, supra note 2, at 635 (arguing distinctions between commercial and
noncommercial speech, based on verifiability of commercial speech, suffer from flawed
reasoning and evidence); see also Post, supra note 133, at 36-37 (noting that durability
ascribed to commercial speech by Court has been convincingly criticized). See generally
Kertz, supra note 137, at n. 92 (remarking on scientific speech as exemplary of speech
that is verifiable and fully protected).
139 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
772 n.24 (1976) (providing Supreme Court's reasoning behind finding that commercial
speech is hardier than other forms of speech). But see 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484, 523 n.4 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(questioning whether commercial speech possesses a greater degree of durability and
expressing doubts regarding distinction between commercial and other types of
speech); Post, supra note 133, at 31-32 (claiming that assertion that commercial speech is
less likely to be chilled than public discourse rests on shaky foundations and chilling
effect of regulation depends as much on the penalty for speech as motivation for it).
140 Kozinski, supra note 2, at 637.
141 See id. (noting many paid professionals that receive full First Amendment
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There are many situations where fully protected speech is as
durable, or more durable than commercial speech. 142 Take for
example, religious speech. Despite a history of persecution and
hostility toward a particular religious belief, many will continue
to relay their message. 143 No matter what obstacles lay in the
way of some religious speakers, they see their cause as above
themselves. 144 "The claim that economic motives render speech
more durable than other motives is based on an empirical
assumption, but one for which it is difficult to find 'much
support."145
The authority to regulate justification for a "commonsense
difference" between commercial speech and noncommercial
speech rests upon circular reasoning.146 The argument is based
Protection); see also Post, supra note 133, at 31-32 (noting that speech classified as
commercial is provided diminished protection while other classifications of speech aimed
at profit are provided full protection). See generally Jonathan Seiden, Scream-ing for a
Solution: Regulating Hollywood Violence; An Analysis of Legal and Legislative Remedies,
3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1010, 1033-34 (2001) (explaining argument that while designed to
create a profit, films are afforded freedom of artistic expression and so should
advertisements aimed at their promotion).
142 See Kozinski, supra note 2, at 637 (arguing against durability rational for
distinguishing commercial and noncommercial speech). But see William S. Dodge,
Weighing the Listener's Interests: Justice Blackmun's Commercial Speech and Public
Forum Opinions, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 179-80 (1998) (suggesting criticisms
aimed at durability ascribed to commercial speech may be valid in narrow sense, but
arguing that distinction is not critical to true theme of Virginia Pharmacy, which was
directed at protecting listeners). See generally Post, supra note 133, at 31-32 (noting
assertion that commercial speech is more durable than other forms of speech has been
persuasively criticized and, in fact, fails close scrutiny).
143 See Kozinski, supra note 2, at 637 (arguing that there are many forms of fully
protected forms of expression that are more durable than commercial speech). See
generally Hon. Roy S. Moore, Religion in the Public Square, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 347, 355
(1998/1999) (noting that religion defines way that one sees the world, way one shows
obedience to the creator, and way one actively pursues will of the creator); David M.
Smolin, Exporting the First Amendment?: Evangelism, Proselytism, and the International
Religious Freedom Act, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 685, 686 (2000/2001) (commenting that rights of
private citizens to proselytize and speak freely about religious matters are deeply
engrained in American society).
144 See Dodge, supra note 142, at 179-80 (conceding commercial speech may not be
more durable than religious speech). See generally Kozinski, supra note 2, at 637 (noting
other interests other than speech may indeed provide stronger motivations than profit);
Moore supra note 143, at 355 (explaining freedom to strive to accomplish duties and
obligations imposed by creator is right in United States).
145 Kozinski, supra note 2, at 637.
146 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (explaining
government's authority to regulate commercial speech is based upon its authority to
prevent commercial harm related to that speech); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) (declaring "there can be no constitutional
objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the
public about lawful activity."). See generally Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 n.9 (1979)
(discussing additional limitations placed on commercial speech over noncommercial
speech).
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on the general government authority to regulate commercial
transactions, thus allowing regulation of speech related to that
transaction. 147 Relying on such logic to combat free speech rights
flies in the face of the First Amendment's purpose.148
Another serious problem undercutting explanations for a
distinction is the definition of commercial speech.149 As stated
earlier, commercial speech is defined as "speech proposing a
commercial transaction."150 Although this is not the test to
determine if the speech is commercial, it still raises some
concerns. Many commercial messages propose no commercial
transaction. 151 Modern advertising often consists of a short piece
of film that merely includes the speaker's product.152 One cannot
classify this under the definition provided for commercial speech
simply because of the economically advantageous intent of the
147 See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 499 (providing somewhat circular reasoning for
government's authority to regulate commercial speech). See generally Cent. Hudson, 447
U.S. at 561-64 (stating 'The protection available for particular commercial expression
turns on the nature both of the expression and of the governmental interests served by its
regulation."); Friedman, 440 U.S. at 10 n.9 (noting commercial speech is linked to
commercial activity and state retains its power to regulate whenever speech is component
of commercial activity).
148 See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (declaring free speech was
intended by Framers of our Constitution "to improve our society and keep it free."); see
also N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-272 (1964) (listing various purposes of the
First Amendment). See generally Colloquia, Campaign Finance Reform: Law and Politics:
Constitutional Implications of Campaign Finance Reform, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 161 n.10
(1994) (proffering underlying purpose of First Amendment).
149 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-62 (providing definition of commercial speech);
see also Friedman, 440 U.S. at 10 (giving general definition of commercial speech and
describing its attributes). See generally Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm. on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385-87 (1973) (describing commercial speech as
proposing commercial transactions and speech conducted with a view towards increased
sales).
150 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562.
151 See, e.g., Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-562 (declaring "[c]ommercial expression
not only serves the economic interests of the speaker, but also assists consumers and
furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of information."); Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)
(noting commercial speech may also be "of general public interest"); see also Nicole
Endejann, Comment: Is the FDA's Nose Growing?: The FDA Does Not "Exaggerate" its
Overall Place in the Universe When Regulating Speech Incident to "Off-Label" Prescription
Drug Labeling and Advertising, 35 AKRON L. REV. 491, 516 (2002) (positing some
commercial messages do not propose commercial transaction)
152 See Kozinski, supra note 2, at 639 (providing example of commercial that does not
advocate viewers to buy product or provide the product's qualities nor disclose price). See
generally Pat Broeske, Outtakes: 'Future' Consumption, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1989, at 31
(describing conspicuous product placement blending commercial speech into
noncommercial speech); Thomas King, For Colas, The Fault is in Too Many Stars, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 24, 1990, at B1 (highlighting blurring of advertising to point that ads are not
distinguishable).
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commercial speech.153 The Court has expressly stated that the
commercial speech distinction cannot turn on the speaker's profit
motive. 154 Doing so would result in the possibility of regulating
fully protected speech that is engaged in for profit. 155
Generally, a biased public debate is corrected by encouraging
counterspeech.15 6 This is not so in the commercial speech
arena.157 Instead, the Court has decided on the extreme to
correct commercial messages. By continuing to allow the degree
of regulation associated with commercial messages, the Court
abandons the traditional debate protected by the First
Amendment.158
The boundaries of the commercial speech category are not
clear.159 In Justice Stevens' words, "any description of
153 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62
(1980) (reinforcing that commercial expression is not limited to serving economic interests
of the speaker); see also Charles Floete, Randall Bezanson, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 819, 843
(2001) (using the Malboro Man as an artistic icon transformed from creative expression to
commercial speech); Kozinski, supra note 2, at 639 (showing artistic elements of modern
advertising).
154 See Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761-65 (indicating the Court's rejection of a
definition based on profit motive must follow once the commercial/noncommercial
distinction is accepted); see also Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959) (declaring it
is of "no matter that the dissemination takes place under commercial auspices.");
Murdock v. Pa., 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943) (contending the mere fact something is sold does
not transform the speech into commercial speech).
155 See Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761-65 (proffering many forms of fully protected
speech are engaged in with profit motive); see also Kozinski, supra note 2, at 638 (stating
"It is not speech that money is spent to project; if it were, all paid advertisements would
be commercial speech..."). See generally Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 (holding "The
protection available for particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of the
expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation.").
156 See Kozinski, supra note 2, at 644 (explaining means to correct bias in public
debate). See generally Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Hous. v. Berkeley,
454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981) (viewing that First Amendment protects differing views and
conflicting ideas); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 584 (1951) (finding "Full and
free discussion even of ideas we hate encourages the testing of our own prejudices and
preconceptions.").
157 See Kozinski, supra note 2, at 644 (indicating counterspeech is not means of
correcting false commercial speech). See generally Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 593
(explaining Court's practice of not protecting false and misleading commercial speech);
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24
(1976) (discussing how disseminator of commercial speech is in best position to verify
truth of their statements and need potential to regulate in order to prevent commercial
speech from being deceptive).
158 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 n.5 (stating Court would grant broad protection
to commercial speech dealing with current public debate); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (holding that First Amendment provides broad protection to political
expression and debate on public issues). See generally Blake D. Morant, Electoral
Integrity: Media, Democracy, and the Value of Self-Restraint, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1 n.215
(2003) (noting that Constitution protects free and open debate).
159 See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 493 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(remarking "the borders of the commercial speech category are not nearly as clear as the
2004] MIXED SPEECH
commercial speech that is intended to identify the category of
speech entitled to less First Amendment protection would relate
to the reasons for permitting broader regulation: namely,
commercial speech's potential to mislead."160 Distinguishing
commercial speech on its ability to mislead ignores the same
possibility inherent in many forms of protected speech.161 For
example, a political candidate can put a favorable spin on an
otherwise unpopular point of view, or a movie may suggest that
all lawyers are liars and cheats. In light of this ambiguity, it
seems necessary to simplify the speech doctrine and do away
with the commercial/noncommercial distinction. 162
There is no clear test for a commercial speech/noncommercial
speech distinction.163 The Kasky v. Nike, Inc.164 court found that
a consideration of three elements is necessary to categorize
speech as commercial or noncommercial: the speaker, the
Court has assumed."); see also Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419
(1993) (recognizing "the difficulty of drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin
commercial speech in a distinct category."); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 579-80 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (addressing importance of
not defining commercial speech too broadly).
160 Rubin, 514 U.S. at 494.
161 See Burt Neuborne, The Third Abraham L. Pomerantz Lecture The First
Amendment and Government Regulation of Economic Markets; Lecture: The First
Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 5, 16
(1989) (explaining that government cannot prevent misleading political speech). See
generally Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (noting how restrictions on false,
deceptive, and misleading commercial speech are permissible); Burt Neuborne, Blues for
the Left Hand: A Critique of Cass Sunstein's Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 439 (1995) (mentioning commercial speech law permits states to
define term 'misleading').
162 See Timothy J. Tatro, Braun v. Soldier of Fortune: Tort Law Enters the Braun's
Age as Constitutional Safeguards for Commercial Speech Buckle "neath the Crunch of
Third-Party Liability", 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957, 971 (1993) (providing that commercial
speech distinction is ambiguous). See generally In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 (1978)
(noting distinction between commercial and expressive speech often blurs and depends on
both speaker's motive and expressive activity's character); Donald E. Lively, The Supreme
Court and Commercial Speech: New Words with an Old Message, 72 MINN. L. REV. 289,
299 (1987) (noting how Supreme Court's perceived differences between commercial and
non-commercial speech are not convincing enough to justify limiting constitutional
protection of commercial speech).
163 See William Shepard McAninch, A Catalyst for the Evolution of Constitutional
Law: Jehovah's Witnesses in the Supreme Court, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 997, 1038 (1987)
(noting that Court has developed no clear test to distinguish religious from commercial
speech). See generally Andi Chang, Note, The Ninth Circuit's Exotic Dance with the
Commercial Speech Doctrine, 1 NEV. L.J. 226, 232 (2001) (noting that Supreme Court
applies intermediate level scrutiny test to commercial speech); Nadir N. Tawil, Comment,
Commercial Speech: A Proposed Definition, 27 HOW. L.J. 1015, 1016 (1984) (mentioning
that commercial and non-commercial speech distinctions are sometimes obliterated).
164 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002) (holding corporation's messages to induce buyers to
purchase its products and inform public about its labor practices were commercial
speech).
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intended audience and the content of what was said. 165 Herein
lies the problem to this technique. A speaker is an individual
likely engaged in commerce, 166 but this definition can potentially
include fully protected speakers such as artists and news
people.167 Defining the intended audience as potential customers
of the speaker is also ambiguous.168 A fully protected speaker's
intended audience can also include purchasers hoping to buy a
product or service. Categorizing speech based on content also
presents a problem because of the possibility of mixing
noncommercial speech with commercial speech.169 Because the
test is unclear, a potential for inconsistent decisions exists.
VII. INEQUITIES: A COLLISION OF PROTECTIONS
There are many examples where commercial speech and
noncommercial speech intersect, leaving one side of the debate
fully protected under the First Amendment, while leaving the
165 See id. at 255-56 (explaining how to categorize particular speech). See generally
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64 (1983) (noting courts have used
common sense distinction test when distinguishing commercial from non-commercial
speech); Tawil, supra note 163, at 1023 (explaining commercial speech's connection to
expression between speaker and audience).
166 See Kasky v. Nike, Inc. 45 P.3d 243, 254-55 (Cal. 2002) (defining commercial
speakers). See generally Earnhardt, supra note 12, at 810 (discussing how absence of
uniform test for commercial speakers, Supreme Court permits increased discretion in
lower courts, uncertainty of commercial speakers, and potential loss of free speech rights);
Tawil, supra note 163, at 1023 (arguing speech is commercial speech if speaker's
expression contains his or his audience's economic interests).
167 See Tara J. Goldsmith, What's Wrong with This Picture? When the Lanham Act
Clashes with Artistic Expression, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PORP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 821, 864-
65 (1997) (explaining how artistic expression may have profit motivation). See generally
Lucasfilm, Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(noting creative parodies are types of non-commercial protected speech); Skilken, supra
note 7, at 1404 (discussing Central Hudson's definition and classification of commercial
speech disqualifies artists and writers, who sell their work, from full First Amendment
protection).
168 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 256 (explaining intended audience). See generally Kerri L.
Keller, Note, Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly: The Supreme Court Sends First Amendment
Guarantees up in Smoke by Applying the Commercial Speech Doctrine to Content-Based
Regulations, 36 AKRON L. REV. 133, n. 237 (2002) (stating Supreme Court has defined
commercial speech as speech that concerns common economic interests between speaker
and audience); Tawil, supra note 163, at 1026 (criticizing prevalent definition of
commercial speech which focuses on expression between speaker and audience);
169 See Mark Mason, A Trojan Horse Goes to Court: Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Corp., 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 203, 210 (1984) (indicating mixture of messages in advertising).
See generally In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 (1978) (noting distinction between
commercial and expressive speech often blurs); Keller, supra note 168, at n.237
(emphasizing that distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech is
nebulous).
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other side open to regulation.170 False statements about a
competitor may be fully protected because commercial speech
consists of factual representations of the speaker's product, not
statements concerning another's.171 This leaves the opposing
commercial speaker at an economic disadvantage. The
commercial speech may also concern matters of public concern. 172
Again, this results in the possibility for one speaker to relay his
message, leaving the other without a forum.173 Also, "[a]
noncommercial speaker's statement criticizing a product are
generally noncommercial speech."174 However, the commercial
speaker's statement concerning the same product is considered
commercial speech and subject to regulation.175
170 See Mason, supra note 169, at 221 (defining mixed commercial and
noncommercial speech as hybrid speech). See generally Michelle Dobrusin, Note, Crass
Commercialism: Is it Public Debate or Sheer Profit? The Controversy of Kasky v. Nike, 24
WHITTIER L. REV. 1139, 1162 (2003) (noting communication containing both commercial
and noncommercial speech may not be treated as commercial speech and still gets First
Amendment protection); Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First
Amendment: A Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 777,
803 (1993) (noting advertising speech, since it contains both commercial and
noncommercial speech, is extremely difficult to regulate in any single manner).
171 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 258 (noting that commercial speaker is one speaking about
their own product or services); see also R. Scott Shieldes, Comment, Suturing Discourses
Within the First Amendment, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1531, 1542-43 (1998) (stating false
statements made in advertisements fall outside of First Amendment protection and thus
regulations prohibiting them are constitutional); see generally Paul T. Hayden, A Goodly
Apple Rotten at the Heart: Commercial Disparagement in Comparative Advertising as
Common-Law Tortious Unfair Competition, 76 IowA L. REV. 67, 67 (1990) (mentioning
how false representation must be commercial speech to be actionable under product
disparagement tort law).
172 See Kasky v. Nike, Inc. 45 P.3d 243, 259 (Cal. 2002) (assuming that commercial
speech may concern matter of public concern). See generally Alan Howard, The
Constitutionality of Deceptive Speech Regulations: Replacing the Commercial Speech
Doctrine with a Tort-Based Relational Framework, 41 CASE W. RES. 1093, 1154 (1991)
(noting how advertisements that contained political and social speech must be analyzed
under less protected commercial speech rather than political speech because political
claims made through advertisement, or commercial speech); McGowan, supra note 59, at
466 n.431 (stating that defamatory speech on matters of public concern is irrelevant to
commercial speech's level of First Amendment protection).
173 See Kasky 45 P.3d at 261 (providing example where commercial speaker is
regulated to advantage of noncommercial speaker). See generally Captain John A. Carr,
The Difference Between Can and Should: Able v. United States and the Continuing Debate
About Homosexual Conduct in the Military, 46 A.F. L. REV. 1, 66 (1999) (discussing how
officials may reasonably regulate speech in nonpublic forums); Captain John A. Carr, Free
Speech in the Military Community: Striking a Balance Between Personal Rights and
Military Necessity, 45 A.F. L. REV. 303, 334 (1998) (emphasizing how government may
impose speech restrictions in nonpublic forums so long as restriction is reasonable and not
imposed solely because public official opposes speaker's views).
174 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 261.
175 See id. (justifying why commercial speech about same product as noncommercial
speech is not fully protected); see also Endejann, supra note 151, at 496 (discussing
commercial speech as including economically motivated advertisements that refer to
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One of the most prevalent areas involving mixed speech
includes religious speakers.176 Most courts agree that the mere
inclusion of a theological component does not convert commercial
speech into noncommercial speech. 177 Despite this view, religious
expression may contain a commercial message.1 78
Evangelists speak about religious topics, but often seek an
economic benefit.1 79 On one hand, these speakers propose a
commercial transaction; hoping listeners will buy their religious
product.18 0 Alternatively, the message may be considered solely
religious.18 ' "If an evangelist and his flock profess to believe that
the purchase of a bag of corn meal will ensure the Lord's good
products); Debra M. Keiser, Note, Regulating the Internet: A Critique ofReno v. ACLU, 62
ALB. L. REV. 769, 775 n.54 (1998) (noting commercial speech doctrine applies to speech
that advertises products for business or profit purposes).
176 See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 222 F.3d 1262, 1275 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting
combinations of religious and commercial messages). See generally Carol E. Garver, A
Review of Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit:
Note: Lowe v. SEC: The First Amendment Status of Investment Advice, 35 AM. U.L. REV.
1253, 1286 (1986) (concluding commercial speech is awarded First Amendment protection
since First Amendment protects free flow of religious and economic information); Leading
Case I: Constitutional Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 144, 232 (1993) (noting that commercial
speech may often contain religious symbols and speech).
177 See Proctor & Gamble Co., 222 F.3d at 1275 (suggesting that adding religious
message to commercial message does not protect speaker). See generally Jamison v.
Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943) (noting commercial speech can contain religious message);
Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787, 795 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding presence of commercial
activity does not change standard of review where organization involved had clear
political message).
178 See Proctor & Gamble Co., 222 F.3d at 1275 (suggesting religious speech may
contain commercial message); see also Jamison, 318 U.S. at 417 (noting actions can
contain religious and commercial aspects); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55
(1942) (positing religious speech can contain commercial message while not being
classified as noncommercial speech).
179 See Kozinski, supra note 2, at 647 (arguing evangelists could be considered either
religious or commercial speakers); see also Lawrence M. Friedman, Lexitainment: Legal
Process as Theater, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 539, 554 (2000) (stating television evangelists seek
to procure money); Roberto P. Aponte Toro, Sanity in International Relations: An
Experience in Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 659, 677 n. 51
(1999) (noting that some evangelist preachers seek money).
180 See Kozinski, supra note 2, at 647 (providing examples of money produced
through evangelism); see also Jonathan Turley, Laying Hands on Religious Racketeers:
Applying Civil RICO to Fraudulent Religious Solicitation, 29 WM AND MARY L. REV. 441,
443 (1988) (discussing television commercials in which evangelists appear). See generally
Steven J. Schloeder, From Mission to Mishmash: How Modernism has failed Sacred
Architecture, 6 NEXUS 67, 67-68 (2001) (noting religion has borrowed characteristics of
business).
181 See Kozinski, supra note 2, at 647 (explaining religious messages with commercial
attributes may be considered protected). See generally Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105, 111 (1943) (noting evangelistic activity should not be considered commercial merely
because they sell religious literature); Schloeder, supra note 180, at 67-68 (discussing
distinct differences between that which relates to business and that which is religious).
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favor, the government has no business saying otherwise."18 2 This
form of mixed speech results in the possibility of chilling a
religious message, a fundamental safeguard of the
Constitution.183
Religion has many characteristics of a commercial
enterprise. 8 4  Although religion is often characterized by
"individual conscience and effort at spiritual fulfillment,"185 it
nonetheless has corporate qualities. Religion has a product,
which the speaker disseminates information about in the hopes
of convincing others to accept that product, and hopes to
accumulate money through the sale of the product. 186 Despite the
fact that churches are often considered nonprofit organizations,
they have the ability to raise large sums of money and reach a
large audience. 8 7 When the church acts like a for-profit
corporation, it should be treated as such,'8 8 regulating its speech
if false or misleading.
182 Kozinski, supra note 2, at 647 (explaining religious messages with commercial
attributes may be considered protected).
183 See Henry L. Chambers, (Un)Welcome Conduct and the Sexually Hostile
Environment, 53 ALA. L. REV. 733, n. 233 (indicating chilling speech violates that First
Amendment); see also Florence Frances Cameron, Note, Defamation Survivability and the
Demise of the Antiquated "Actio Personalis"Doctrine, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1851 (1985)
(stating that chilling speech is violation of First Amendment); Alison P. Howard, A Fistful
of Lawsuits: The Press, the First Amendment, and Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 127, 173 (2000) (noting First Amendment's goal of encouraging, not chilling
speech).
184 See McAninch, supra note 163, at 1026 (indicating religion has commercial
characteristics); see also John Celichowski, A Rough and Narrow Path: Preserving Native
American Religious Liberty in the Smith Era, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 8 n. 49 (2000/2001)
(recognizing religion sometimes requires commercial transactions); Rebecca Tsosie,
Reclaiming Native Stories: An Essay on Cultural Appropriation and Cultural Rights, 34
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 299, 312 (2002) (noting religions which have commercial aspects).
185 McAninch, supra note 163, at 1026 (contrasting individual religion and corporate
religion).
186 See Mark E. Chopko, Stating Claims Against Religious Institutions, 44 B.C. L.
REV. 1089, 1104 (2003) (indicating churches can be like corporations); see also John S.
Barker, Prosecuting Dioceses and Bishops, 44 B.C. L. REV 1061, 1086 (2003) (discussing
church as corporate entity); Eric Enlow, The Corporate Conception of the State and the
Origins of Limited Constitutional Government, 6 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 1, 18 (2001)
(explaining that church was considered corporation).
187 See Marina Angel, Susan Glaspell's Trifles and a Jury of Her Peers: Women Abuse
in a Literary and Legal Context, 45 BUFFALO L. REV. 779, 807 (1997) (noting ability of
churches to raise money); see also Mary L. Clark, The Founding of the Washington College
of Law: The First Law School Established by Women for Women, 47 AM. U.L. REV. 613, n.
182 (1998) (discussing church organizations formed to raise money). See generally John
Warren Kindt, Gambling: Socioeconomic Impacts and Public Policy, 556 ANNALS 85, 87
(1998) (stating charitable church gambling has been used to raise money).
188 See generally Chopko, supra note 186, at 1104 (providing case where church is
defendant); Alison H. Eaton, Comment: Can The IRS Overrule The Supreme Court?, 45
EMORY L.J. 987, 994 (1996) (noting instances where churches seek to make money); Jacob
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VIII. REMEDIES: FALSE AND MISLEADING SPEECH CAN BE
PUNISHED ABSENT THE DISTINCTION
The distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech
is confusing and often ambiguous.1S 9 The best way to deal with
this problem is to abandon the distinction completely. 190 This
would allow the court to comport with the neutrality demanded
by the First Amendment. 191
It is argued that protecting commercial and noncommercial
speech the same dilutes protection afforded to noncommercial
speech. 192 This argument is totally unfounded. Protecting speech
in one place has never resulted in dilution of protection in
another place.193
Attaching full First Amendment protection to commercial
speech does not prevent the government from punishing a
commercial speaker for relaying false and misleading
L. Todres, Internal Revenue Code Section 170: Does The Receipt By A Donor Of An
Intangible Religious Benefit Reduce The Amount Of The Charitable Contribution
Deduction? Only The Lord Knows For Sure, 64 TENN. L. REV. 91, 143 (1996) (discussing
instance where church operates in commercial manner and aims to make money).
189 See Tatro, supra note 162, at 971 (noting the commercial speech distinction is
ambiguous); see also Deseriee A. Kennedy, Marketing Goods, Marketing Images: The
Impact of Advertising on Race, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 615, 623 (2000) (discussing debate as to
whether distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech is credible); John 0.
McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 49, 76 (1996) (noting that differences between commercial and non-commercial
speech are quite subtle).
190 See Goach, supra note 120, at 637 (arguing for abandonment of commercial speech
distinction); see also Earnhardt, supra note 12, at 798 (discussing arguments in favor of
eliminating distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech); Stephen M.
Worth, "Do Not Call" Laws And The First Amendment: Testing The Limits Of Commercial
Free Speech Protection, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 467, 487 (2003) (noting need to
eliminate distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech due to absence of
any coherent analytical framework).
191 See Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Rehnquist Court Makes Sport with the 14th
Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 411, 412 (2003) (noting importance of neutrality to First
Amendment). See generally Earnhardt, supra note 12, at 798 (noting elimination of
distinction would abide by First Amendment); Worth, supra note 190, at 487 (claiming
some justices indicate possibility of elimination of distinction).
192 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (stating "to require
a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and non-commercial speech alike
could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment's
guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech"); see also Bd. of Trustees of the State
of N.Y. v. Fox 492 U.S. 469, 481 (1989) (citing quote from Ohralik arguing maintenance of
distinction in fact strengthens First Amendment protection). But see McGowan, supra
note 59, at 370-71 (criticizing decision in Ohralik indicating differentiation between
commercial and noncommercial causes dilution).
193 See Kozinski, supra note 2, at 648 (explaining that protection for judges to draw
upon is not constant). See generally Pace, supra note 77, at 39 (discussing First
Amendment application to commercial speech); Yanes, supra note 45, at 1487
(highlighting history of commercial speech).
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information.194 Fraud of this type is covered by a wide variety of
rules and regulations that do not implicate First Amendment
issues.195 "Prevention of consumer fraud is unquestionable a
substantial governmental interest; even the most ardent
libertarians agree that it is a legitimate role of government to
prevent citizens from cheating one another."196 Creating a fraud
statute is thus possible and should be considered as an
alternative to distinguishing commercial and noncommercial
speech.197
IX. CONCLUSION
The belief in a need for a commercial speech distinction is
clouded by misconceived concerns and flawed logic. Commercial
speech is considered verifiable, hardy and authorized by other
regulations.198 Although this may be true, it does not provide the
basis for distinguishing it from noncommercial speech.199
A noncommercial speaker is fully protected by the First
Amendment, yet may have far more in common with the
commercial speaker than is readily apparent. 200 Religious,
194 See Kozinski, supra note 2, at 651 (explaining how to punish commercial speakers
without commercial speech distinction); Carro & Martinez, supra note 54, at 70 (stating
unlawful and misleading commercial speech not protected); see also Pace, supra note 77,
at 39 (noting that First Amendment is not applicable to false or misleading commercial
speech).
195 See Kozinski, supra note 2, at 651 (noting fraud can still be regulated); see also
Pace, supra note 77, at 39 (discussing treatment of misleading commercial speech). See
generally Dodge, supra note 142, at 179 (explaining prohibition on deceptive advertising).
196 Kozinski, supra note 2, at 634.
197 See Kozinski, supra note 2, at 651 (revealing ease of creating fraud statute to
protect against false and misleading commercial messages); see also Dodge, supra note
142, at 179 (describing preventative measures government could take); Pace, supra note
77, at 39 (establishing government freedom to regulating fraud).
198 See Edward J. Schoen, et al., United Foods and Wileman Bros.: Protection Against
Compelled Commercial Speech-Now Your See It, Now You Don't, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 467, 480
(2002) (providing alleged characteristics of commercial speech); see also Carro & Martinez,
supra note 54, at 70 (citing commercial speech doctrine); Skilken, supra note 7, at 1397
(explaining value of commercial speech to public).
199 See Kozinski, supra note 2, at 634-38 (arguing commercial speech is not more
durable and verifiable than noncommercial speech); see also Bond, supra note 63, at 2517
(discussing faults of commercial/noncommercial speech distinction); Aaron A. Goach, Free
Speech and Freer Speech: Glickman v. Wileman Bors. & Elliot, Inc., 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 623, 633-34 (1998) (criticizing arbitrary distinctions between noncommercial and
commercial speech).
200 See Elisabeth Alden Langworthy, Note, Time, Place or Manner Restrictions on
Commercial Speech, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 127, 141 n.85 (1983) (noting similarities
between forms of expression); see also Bond, supra note 63, at 2517 (discussing
commercial and non.commercial speech); Goach, supra note 199, at 634 (citing similarities
shared by noncommercial and commercial speech).
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political, artistic and many other forms of fully protected speech
can have the same profit motivation as the commercial
speaker. 201  Verification of some noncommercial speech is
possible. 202 Also, commercial speech is no hardier than many
forms of noncommercial speech. 203 By realizing the similarities,
the commercial speech distinction loses its appeal. 204
Determining the level of protection afforded to mixed speech
presents a problem. The court is forced to decide on a multitude
of issues to classify the message as either commercial or
noncommercial. 205 The result is the possibility of inconsistent
decisions and unfair regulation of some speakers. 206  By
abandoning the commercial/noncommercial speech distinction,
we are no longer forced to classify the speech at issue, and can
decide the case on the merits as opposed to technicalities.
The Constitution explicitly bars abridging the freedom of
speech. 207 By developing a commercial speech distinction we run
afoul of this fundamental protection. The result is a doctrine
201 See Aaron A. Polak, Free Legal Trade: American First Amendment Theory Fails to
Persuade Canadian Courts, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 579, 605 (1994) (indicating forms of
protected speech can be motivated by profit); see also Robert G. Shwemm & Rigel C.
Oliveri, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 771, 830 n.285 (2002) (distinguishing sexually harassing speech
from political and religious protected speech). See generally Bond, supra note 63, at 2517
(arguing about failure of commercial distinction to account for motivations of speech).
202 See Michael W. Field, Note, On Tap, 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Islan&" Last
Call for the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 57, 84 (1996)
(suggesting commercial speech is not more verifiable than noncommercial speech); see
also Bond, supra note 63, at 2517 (referring to ambiguity in commercial/noncommercial
distinction). See generally Sullivan, supra note 8, at 126 (criticizing
commercial/noncommercial distinction).
203 See Kozinski, supra note 2, at 637 (arguing against durability rationale for
distinguishing commercial and noncommercial speech); see also Goach, supra note 199, at
634 (noting noncommercial speech is often as objective as commercial speech). See
generally Remington, supra note 90, at 1462 (arguing features of verifiability and
hardiness fail to hold relevance some courts have placed upon them).
204 See Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993) (recognizing
"the difficulty of drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a
distinct category."); see also Bond, supra note 63, at 2517 (criticizing
commercial/noncommercial distinction used by courts); Goach, supra note 199, at 634
(arguing that commercial and noncommercial distinction could not withstand scrutiny).
205 See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983) (revealing it is
sometimes difficult to determine whether speech is commercial); see also Carro &
Martinez, supra note 54, at 70 (citing numerous decisions on commercial speech);
Sullivan, supra note 202, at 126 (noting ambiguity of commercial speech cases).
206 See Langvardt, supra note 50, at 609 (noting Court's inconsistency when dealing
with commercial speech); see also Carro & Martinez, supra note 54, at 70-71 (discussing
erosion of commercial speech doctrine); Yanes, supra note 45, at 1461 (1998) (observing
changes in Court's treatment of commercial speech).
207 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (protecting freedom of speech); see also Ansson, supra
note 4, at 4 (referring to First Amendment's granting of fundamental right of citizens to
speak); Tatro, supra note 162, at 971 (noting First Amendment protection of free speech).
MIXED SPEECH
that is not based on the Constitution, but rather is applied
subjectively relying on flawed logic and misconceptions. 208
208 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing for protection of speech); see also Langvardt,
supra note 92, at 380-81 (noting Court is inconsistent when dealing with speech issues).
See generally Kozinski, supra note 2, at 631 (arguing that proponents of commercial
speech distinction cannot rest their beliefs on Constitution).
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